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Abstract 
During the 2008 heparin crisis, a tainted blood-thinning drug imported from 
China caused the deaths of at least eighty people in the United States.  However, 
despite the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) reactive measures, the 
American regulatory framework for drug safety remains largely unchanged.  
Currently, about 80% of active pharmaceutical ingredients, 40% of finished drugs, 
and 50% of all medical devices used in the United States are imported from over 100 
countries.  With the growth of product outsourcing, pharmaceutical companies in the 
United States have stopped manufacturing many essential medicines.  Nevertheless, 
the FDA’s foreign inspections have lagged.  It would take the FDA more than 
eighteen years to inspect all the establishments in China that produce drugs for the 
United States, eight times longer than it would take to inspect all domestic firms.  To 
offset inadequate foreign inspections, the FDA emphasizes cooperation with 
exporting countries in the hope that foreign governments will share the burden of 
ensuring the safety of imported drugs in the U.S. market.  Essentially, the FDA is 
outsourcing its regulatory power to other countries, some of which are highly 
susceptible to corrupt regulatory practices and counterfeit production.  Since China 
is responsible for the largest percentage of drugs imported into the United States, 
this Article uses China as an example and argues that the FDA’s regulatory 
outsourcing approach is seriously flawed.  The FDA has largely overlooked the 
unique challenges that Chinese regulators face in ensuring drug safety. 
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I. THE FDA’S CHALLENGES IN REGULATING IMPORTED 
DRUGS 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is responsible for “protecting public 
health by ensuring the safety of a wide range of food and medical products.”1  The 
FDA is “the oldest comprehensive consumer protection agency in the U.S. federal 
government.”2  Its modern function was first defined in the Pure Food and Drug Act 
(PFDA) of 1906.3  In 1938, Congress passed the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act (FDCA) in response to a well-publicized accident involving an untested elixir 
drug that “killed 107 people, including many children.”4  To regain public trust, the 
 
1. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-46, FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION:  BETTER 
COORDINATION COULD ENHANCE EFFORTS TO ADDRESS ECONOMIC ADULTERATION AND PROTECT 
THE PUBLIC HEALTH 2 (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585861.pdf [hereinafter GAO-
12-46]. 
2.  About FDA:  History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/ 
History/default.htm (last updated July 29, 2010). 
3. Richard A. Merrill & Jeffrey K. Francer, Organizing Federal Food Safety Regulation, 31 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 61, 79 (2000) (“The PFDA made it a misdemeanor to introduce adulterated food into 
interstate commerce.  It granted the Secretary of Agriculture the authority to examine food specimens for 
possible adulteration and directed the Secretary to report potential violations to the Department of 
Justice.”). 
4.  Regulatory Information:  Legislation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Regulatory 
Information/Legislation/default.htm (last updated July 9, 2012); MICHAEL SCHUMANN ET AL., FOOD 
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FDCA completely overhauled the public health system.  The FDCA required drug 
makers to seek FDA approval before marketing any new drugs.5  The law also 
authorized the FDA to conduct factory inspections to ensure drug safety.6  The 
FDCA set forth the current food and drug regulatory framework in the United 
States.  The FDA has developed into a powerful agency, which regulates 
approximately one quarter of total U.S. consumer expenditures.7  
However, globalization and pharmaceutical outsourcing have dramatically 
increased the volume of imported products that fall within the FDA’s jurisdiction.  
Approximately 80% of Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (API), 40% of finished 
drugs, and 50% of all medical devices used in the United States are imported.8  With 
the growth of product outsourcing, pharmaceutical companies in the United States 
have stopped manufacturing many essential medicines.  A telling example is that 
Americans today rely entirely on imported antibiotics because no domestic firm 
produces a single dose.9  Despite efforts to lure manufacturing jobs back to the 
United States, it is expected that China and India will continue to increase the 
exportation of FDA-regulated drugs and medical equipment to the United States by 
at least 12% in the next decade.10  Cost minimization is the primary driving force for 
outsourcing.  One survey indicates that the cost of producing an API can be as much 
as 40% lower in India than in the United States.11  In addition, pharmaceuticals have 
seen increasing costs in the past decade.12  However, due to limited breakthroughs, 
research and development (R&D) investments have led to largely disappointing 
results.  “The number of New Molecular Entity approvals,” an indicator of 
productivity, has decreased sharply since 2000.13  Therefore, outsourcing remains the 
primary means for pharmaceutical companies to remain afloat in the overly 
competitive market.  As a result of pharmaceutical outsourcing, importation of “high 
risk” medical products to the U.S. market quadrupled between 2000 and 2007.14  
Many medical devices, which were at one time produced domestically, are 
 
SAFETY LAW 7 (1997); Merrill & Francer, supra note 3 at 81. 
5. SCHUMANN, supra note 4, at 7. 
6. Milestones in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ 
AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Milestones/ucm128305.htm (last visited July 23, 2012) [hereinafter FDA 
Milestones]. 
7. RONALD HAMOWY, THE INDEP. INST., INDEPENDENT POLICY REPORT:  MEDICAL DISASTERS 
AND THE GROWTH OF THE FDA 2 (2010), available at http://www.independent.org/ 
pdf/policy_reports/2010-02-10-fda.pdf; Gardiner Harris, The Safety Gap, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/02/magazine/02fda-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
8. GAO-12-46, supra note 1, at 2. 
9. The Diane Rehm Show:  Addressing Prescription Drug Shortages, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 2, 
2011), available at http://thedianerehmshow.org/shows/2011-11-02/addressing-prescription-drug-shortages/ 
transcript; see also Gardiner Harris, Drug Making’s Move Abroad Stirs Concern, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/20/health/policy/20drug.html (“The critical ingredients for most 
antibiotics are now made almost exclusively in China and India.”). 
10. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PATHWAY TO GLOBAL PRODUCT SAFETY AND QUALITY 20 (2011), 
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OC/GlobalProductPathway/ 
UCM259845.pdf [hereinafter GLOBAL PRODUCT SAFETY]. 
11. Id. at 13. 
12. Id. at 9–10. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 18. 
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“increasingly being manufactured overseas and imported.”15 For example, it would 
take the FDA about eighteen years to inspect all of the establishments in China that 
produce drugs for the United States, almost eight times longer than if the FDA 
inspected domestic firms.16  Nevertheless the FDA’s foreign inspections have lagged.   
The FDA’s ineffective supervision of drug safety prompted the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) to add “[t]he oversight of medical 
products” to its High-Risk List in 2009.17  The GAO explained that the “FDA was 
facing multiple challenges that threatened to compromise its ability to protect the 
public health.”18  The GAO identified several areas of weakness in the FDA’s 
oversight of drug safety, “including inspections of foreign manufacturing 
establishments, postmarket safety monitoring, and oversight of clinical trials.”19  
Because of its inadequate efforts to address serious problems identified by the GAO, 
the FDA has consistently remained on the High-Risk List since 2009.20 
To offset inadequate foreign inspections, the FDA has expanded efforts to 
cooperate with exporting countries in the hope that foreign governments will share 
the burden of ensuring imported drug safety in the U.S. market.21  Essentially, the 
FDA is outsourcing its regulatory power to other countries, some of which are highly 
susceptible to corrupt regulatory practices and counterfeit production.  Since China 
has “more establishments manufacturing drugs that were offered for import into the 
United States than any other foreign country,”22 this Article uses China as an 
example and argues that the FDA’s regulatory outsourcing approach is seriously 
flawed, because it has largely overlooked the unique challenges that Chinese 
regulators face in safeguarding drug safety.  Part I of the Article examines the drug 
safety regulatory framework and the challenges that the FDA faces in conducting 
foreign inspections and preventing counterfeit drugs from entering the U.S. market.  
In Part II, the Article analyzes the FDA’s regulatory outsourcing approach and its 
agreement with China regarding drug safety.  Part III offers a detailed analysis of the 
Chinese regulatory framework on drug safety and the unique challenges that China 
faces in enforcing its laws. 
 
15. Id. 
16. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-961, DRUG SAFETY:  FDA HAS CONDUCTED 
MORE FOREIGN INSPECTIONS AND BEGUN TO IMPROVE ITS INFORMATION ON FOREIGN 
ESTABLISHMENTS, BUT MORE PROGRESS IS NEEDED 15–16 (2010), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10961.pdf [hereinafter GAO-10-961]. 
17. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-278, HIGH-RISK SERIES:  AN UPDATE 115 
(2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11278.pdf. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id.  GAO will remove the listed government agency from its High-Risk List if the agency has 
made adequate efforts to address areas of weaknesses.  Id. at 3. 
21. See GLOBAL PRODUCT SAFETY, supra note 10, at 24–25 (calling for increased emphasis on 
cooperation with foreign governments to effectively regulate drugs being imported into the United States). 
22. U.S.  GOV’T  ACCOUNTABILITY  OFFICE,  GAO-08-970,  DRUG SAFETY:  BETTER  DATA 
MANAGEMENT AND MORE INSPECTIONS ARE NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN FDA’S FOREIGN DRUG 
INSPECTION PROGRAM 15 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/281366.pdf [hereinafter 
GAO-08-970]. 
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A. The Heparin Crisis  
Heparin is a blood thinner that is commonly used in cardiac surgery and 
dialysis.23  In 2008, at least eighty-one deaths in the United States were linked to 
contaminated heparin imported from China by Baxter International.24  Hundreds of 
patients suffered allergic reactions after using the drug.25  German health officials 
reported at least eighty cases of adverse reactions to heparin during the same 
period.26  In response, Baxter International recalled “virtually all of its heparin 
products” from the U.S. market.27  
China was the world’s biggest supplier of the active ingredient used in heparin.28  
The raw materials for making heparin came from mucous membranes in pig 
intestines, which were being processed in unregulated family workshops.29  Pig 
farmers sold the cooked mucous membranes to consolidators, who in turn sold them 
to drug makers.30  Neither the extraction process nor the working environment was 
subject to any regulation.  Before the crisis, the FDA had never inspected 
Changzhou SPL, the Chinese manufacturer that exported contaminated heparin to 
the United States.31  
After an intensive investigation, scientists finally determined that the 
contaminant was chemically altered chondroitin sulfate, which was twenty times 
cheaper than the real active ingredient in heparin.32  Although the contaminant did 
not have blood-thinning properties, it had “such a close resemblance to heparin that 
it had fooled standard quality tests and made it into the United States.”33  While it 
remains unclear at which stage the contamination occurred, the harmful chemical 
 
23. Heparin decreases the clotting ability of blood, thereby preventing formation of clots and 
stopping the growth of already existing clots.  It has been marketed in the United States for 
nearly seventy years and is used in a variety of clinical settings, including during kidney dialysis 
and cardiac procedures, and for treatment or prevention of serious medical conditions, including 
pulmonary embolis and deep vein thrombosis.  Over one million multi-dose vials of heparin are 
sold per month in the United States.  Baxter supplies about half of the heparin sold in this 
country. 
In re Heparin Prods. Liab. Litiga., MDL No. 1953, 2011 WL 1097637, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 
2011). 
24. Gardiner Harris, Heparin Contamination May Have Been Deliberate, F.D.A. Says, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 30, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/30/health/policy/30heparin.html.  According to The New 
York Times, “149 deaths from allergic reactions were reported among people who took heparin from Jan. 
1, 2007, to May 31, 2008.”  Bettina Wassener, In China, Strong Debut for Supplier of Heparin, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/07/business/global/07drug.html. 
25. Walt Bogdanich, Heparin Find May Point to Chinese Counterfeiting, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/20/health/20heparin.html. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. David Barboza, China Orders New Oversight of Heparin, with Tainted Batches Tied to U.S. 
Deaths, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/22/world/asia/22heparin.html. 
29. Walt Bogdanich, The Drug Scare That Exposed a World of Hurt, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/30/weekinreview/30bogdanich.html. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Bogdanich, supra note 25. 
33. Jake Hooker and Walt Bogdanich, Scientists Near Source of Altered Heparin, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
19, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/19/world/asia/19heparin.html. 
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was apparently added to increase the yield of heparin by combining it with a 
counterfeit substance.34  The heparin crisis has exposed two challenges facing the 
FDA:  (1) inadequate foreign inspections, and (2) the lack of a mechanism to prevent 
counterfeit drugs from entering into the U.S. market. 
B. FDA Inspections and Challenges in Foreign Countries 
The FDA’s authority to conduct regular inspections stems mainly from Section 
704 of the FDCA.  In addition, Sections 505 and 515 authorize the FDA to conduct 
inspections for the purpose of pre-market approval of new drugs and medical 
devices.  Inspection of pharmaceutical facilities is one of the most important 
enforcement tools used to secure drug safety.  In most cases, inspection is the only 
effective means through which the FDA is able to identify potential health threats.  
Without inspection, the FDA has no legitimate grounds for utilizing other post-
market enforcement tools, such as seizure, injunction, or recall. 
The FDCA grants the FDA wide discretion in deciding when and how it 
conducts an inspection.35  The FDA is required to give advance notice with an 
owner’s valid consent, or if the consent is withheld, to produce a warrant.36  If the 
FDA reasonably believes that a serious violation of the FDCA has occurred, it may 
conduct a raid.37  Refusing an FDA inspection may lead to one year of imprisonment 
and a fine of up to $1,000.38  The owner may also face government seizure or an 
injunction. 39   Forcible actions against inspectors can also lead to criminal 
punishment. 40   Because of serious punishments upon refusal, most U.S. firms 
cooperate with FDA inspections.41  
The coverage of an FDA inspection of prescription drugs and restricted devices 
is broad.  The inspection can reach “all things.”42  This includes not only the “factory, 
warehouse or establishment in which foods, drugs, devices, or cosmetics are 
manufactured, processed, packed or held,” 43  but also “records, files, papers, 
processes, controls, and [other] facilities.”44  Despite the FDA’s broad discretion, it 
faces serious challenges in conducting inspections on foreign drugs and medical 
device manufacturers. 
 
34. Id. 
35. See 21 U.S.C. § 374 (2012) (listing the broad powers granted to the FDA to conduct inspections). 
36. See United States v. Jamieson-McKames Pharm., Inc., 651 F.2d 532, 540 (1981) (“[A]n inspection 
pursuant to a § 374 notice to inspect is authorized only when there is a valid consent.  If consent is 
withheld, a separate violation of the Act occurs, and the FDA inspectors are required to obtain a warrant 
before the inspection can proceed.”). 
37. Id. 
38. I JAMES T. O’REILLY, FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION § 20:14 (3d ed. 2007). 
39. Id. § 20:1. 
40. Id. § 20:12. 
41. Id. § 20:11. 
42. Id. § 20:3. 
43. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
44. Id. 
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1. Challenges to Foreign Inspections   
The FDCA requires the FDA to inspect establishments in the United States 
every two years,45 but it does not have the same requirement for inspecting foreign 
establishments exporting to the United States.46  Instead, the FDCA relies on 
cooperative agreements with foreign governments to ensure that imported drugs or 
devices are manufactured properly.47  The FDA has the power to refuse the entry of 
imported drugs or medical devices at the border, but it can only do so when it has 
sufficient evidence that the manufacturing process of a foreign establishment 
violated the FDCA.48  Because the FDA cannot conduct an adequate inspection, this 
burden is very hard to meet.  Thus, foreign inspection is crucial in keeping foreign-
produced drugs and medical products in compliance with U.S. law and regulations. 
The FDA began conducting foreign inspections of certain European antibiotic 
firms in 1955.49  The 1976 medical device amendment to the FDCA extended the 
scope of the FDA’s foreign inspections to include foreign medical device and 
diagnostic manufacturers.50  However, the FDA did not have a written inspection 
procedure until 1983.51  The current guide to foreign inspections is an updated 
version of the procedure created in 1999.52 
Despite the FDA’s continuous efforts to increase foreign inspections,53 foreign 
establishments are subject to fewer inspections than their domestic counterparts.54  In 
2009, the FDA conducted 424 inspections of foreign establishments, which accounted 
for 11% of all foreign establishments.55  At this rate, it would take the FDA about 
nine years to inspect all foreign establishments once.56  In contrast, the FDA 
conducted 1,015 inspections in the United States, comprising approximately 40% of 
all domestic establishments.57  At this rate, it would take the FDA about two and a 
half years to inspect all domestic firms.58  
Since China has the largest number of establishments exporting to the United 
States, it would take the FDA even longer to cycle through inspections.  It would 
take the FDA “about 18 years to inspect all of the 920 establishments in China.”59  
 
45. 21 U.S.C. § 360(h) (2012). 
46. See id. § 360(i)(3) (requiring only that FDA cooperate “with officials of foreign countries to 
ensure that adequate and effective means are available for purposes of determining . . . whether drugs or 
devices . . . if imported or offered for import into the United States, shall be refused admission”). 
47. Id. 
48. Id. § 381(a). 
49. DIV. OF FIELD INVESTIGATION,  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL 
INSPECTIONS AND TRAVEL ch. 1 § 100 (2002), available at http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/Inspections/ 
ForeignInspections/ucm110616.htm#SUB100. 
50. Id. 
51. Inspections, Compliance, Enforcement, and Criminal Investigations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/Inspections/ForeignInspections/ucm110593.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2012). 
52. Id. 
53. GAO-10-961, supra note 16, at 11. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 15. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. GAO-10-961, supra note 16, at 16. 
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL  Volume 48, Issue 1 
8 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 48:1 
Even worse, due to lack of resources and limited legal authority, nearly 64% of 
foreign establishments—or 2,394 out of 3,765 in the FDA’s inventory for the fiscal 
year of 2009—may never have been inspected by the FDA.60  Almost half of the 
uninspected establishments are in China and India.61 
The disparity between inspections of foreign and domestic establishments exists 
not only in frequency but also in coverage.  There are two types of FDA inspections:  
preapproval inspections and Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP) inspections.62  A 
preapproval inspection takes place when an establishment seeks approval of a new 
drug to be marketed in the United States.  Upon receiving the application, the FDA 
may conduct inspections of the establishment to verify whether it in fact follows what 
it has promised in the application. 63   A GMP inspection is conducted at an 
establishment that has already marketed products in the United States.64  The 
purpose of a GMP inspection is to determine whether the drugs produced in the 
establishment are of high quality. 65   Without GMP inspections, preapproval 
inspections cannot ensure the establishments’ continued compliance.66  
In practice, however, relatively fewer foreign establishments have been 
subjected to GMP inspections compared with domestic establishments.67  In 2009, 
only 17% of foreign inspections were GMP-only inspections.68  In other words, 83% 
of foreign inspections had preapproval components, which means that the 
inspections were either preapproval-only or inspections that combined preapproval 
and GMP inspections.69  In contrast, 82% of domestic inspections were GMP-only 
inspections, while only 18% were preapproval inspections or combined inspections.70 
In addition, the FDA faces resistance from foreign firms, a challenge that it 
rarely encounters while inspecting domestic firms.  Even with a cooperative 
agreement with a foreign government, the FDA is not likely to enjoy the foreign 
government’s assistance in its inspections, especially in times of crisis.  For example, 
during the heparin crisis, a consolidator of the tainted raw heparin ingredient refused 
to cooperate with FDA inspectors.71  FDA inspectors were denied access to the 
consolidator’s laboratory and records. 72   If the same crisis affected Chinese 
consumers, the Chinese government likely would have quickly raided the suspected 
plant and taken the managers into custody.73  Furthermore, if the tainted products 
 
60. Id. at 16–17. 
61. Id. at 17. 
62. Id. at 7. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. GAO-10-961, supra note 16, at 7. 
66. See Chenglin Liu, The Obstacles of Outsourcing Imported Food Safety to China, 43 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 249, 268 (2010) (“Without regular periodic audits, foreign factories are not likely to take the 
GMP or the HACCP processes seriously because compliance with these procedures requires additional 
costs.”). 
67. GAO-10-961, supra note 16, at 19. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 18. 
70. Id. at 18–19. 
71. U.S.  GOV’T  ACCOUNTABILITY  OFFICE,  GAO-11-936T,  DRUG SAFETY:   FDA  FACES 
CHALLENGES OVERSEEING THE FOREIGN DRUG MANUFACTURING SUPPLY CHAIN 7 (2011), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/126943.pdf [hereinafter GAO-11-936T]. 
72. Id. 
73. See Chenglin Liu, Profits Above the Law:  China’s Melamine Tainted Milk Incident, 79 MISS. L.J. 
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had caused the deaths of Chinese citizens, the CEO and other managers would likely 
be subject to criminal investigation.74  If convicted, the CEO and other managers 
would face life sentences or even the death penalty.75  However, since the victims of 
the heparin crisis were not Chinese citizens, the Chinese government was not subject 
to the mounting public pressure that it had seen in previous food and drug scandals 
that claimed lives in China.76  The Chinese government did not even initiate its own 
probe, let alone prosecute anyone.77  The only public response from the Chinese 
government after the heparin crisis was its vigorous denial that the tainted raw 
heparin had caused deaths in the United States.78  Thus, the Chinese government’s 
involvement in dealing with the heparin crisis was noticeably absent.79 
Furthermore, the FDA cannot conduct foreign inspections without prior 
notice.80  Surprise inspections are crucial for quality control, which explains why the 
FDCA grants the FDA wide discretion to conduct inspections of domestic firms.81  
According to FDA officials, it is very difficult for inspectors to get an accurate 
glimpse of the manufacturing process when the manufacturer has been notified 
months in advance.82  However, unannounced inspections of foreign facilities are 
almost impossible to conduct because, in some cases, the FDA can only gain access 
to the facilities by first receiving permission from the foreign government.83  For 
example, 
During the pet food scandal of 2007, the FDA intended to inspect the 
suspected factories in China.  The Chinese government deliberately 
delayed the FDA inspectors’ visas.  One report stated that when inspectors 
finally reached the two suspected plants in southern China, one plant had 
already been bulldozed and the other one was deserted.  According to 
another report, the owner of the factory not only bulldozed the building, 
but also deeply plowed the ground to ensure that U.S. inspectors would 
not find any trace of melamine.84  
Costs are another impediment to FDA inspections of foreign firms.  Because of 
logistical hurdles and long-distance travel, the average cost for the FDA to conduct a 
foreign inspection is around $52,000, which is more than twice the cost of a domestic 
inspection.85 
 
371, 386–88 (2009) (detailing the process of governmental confrontation of the sale of tainted baby 
formula in China). 
74. See id. at 387 (explaining that a criminal investigation would be proper for the sale of poisonous 
food or drugs under the criminal law of China). 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 373. 
77. Alicia Mundy, China Never Investigated Tainted Heparin, Says Probe, WALL ST. J. (July 22, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703954804575381540372921432.html. 
78. Gardiner Harris, U.S. Identifies Tainted Heparin in 11 Countries, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/22/health/policy/22fda.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1. 
79. Id. 
80. GAO-11-936T, supra note 71, at 7. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Liu, supra note 66, at 269. 
85. GLOBAL PRODUCT SAFETY, supra note 10, at 24. 
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Additionally, the FDA’s lack of information regarding foreign firms that export 
to the United States only contributes to inadequate inspections.86  According to a 
2008 GAO report, there was a large gap between the FDA’s registration database, 
which had information on 3,000 foreign establishments, and its import database, 
which recorded around 6,800 foreign establishments.87  One reason for the gap is that 
some foreign firms use FDA registration status as a marketing gimmick, attempting 
to trick local consumers to believe that their products have been either approved or 
endorsed by the FDA in the United States.  Even though they remain FDA-
registered establishments, such firms may not have actually offered products in the 
U.S. market.88  Because the registration and import data are not electronically 
integrated, FDA officials have to manually compare some of the foreign 
establishments across the two databases.89  Despite the FDA’s recent effort to 
improve information management, it still relies on multiple, sometimes inaccurate, 
sources in determining which foreign establishments are subject to surveillance 
inspection.90   
 
  
 
86. GAO-08-970, supra note 22, at 18–19. 
87. Id. at 5. 
88. Id. at 18. 
89. Id. at 17. 
90. GAO-10-961, supra note 16, at 9. 
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Number of Establishments in the FDA’s Inventory That May Never Have Been 
Inspected by the FDA and Total Estimated Number of Establishments in the FDA’s 
Inventory, by Country, Fiscal Year 200991 
 
Countries with the 
largest number of 
establishments in 
FDA’s inventory that 
may never have been 
inspected 
Number of 
establishments in 
FDA’s inventory 
that may never 
have been 
inspected 
Estimated 
number of 
establishments 
in FDA’s 
inventory 
Percent of 
establishments in 
FDA’s inventory 
that may never 
have been 
inspected 
China  811 920  88 
India  323 502  64 
Canada  206 310  66 
France  107 188  57 
Japan  99 207  48 
Germany  97 228  43 
United Kingdom  82 191  43 
South Korea  69 75  92 
Mexico  57 76  75 
Italy  55 168  33 
All other countries  488 900  54 
Foreign total  2,394 3,765  64 
Domestic total  253  2,498  10 
 
C. Counterfeit Drugs 
Most Americans have confidence in the integrity of drugs in the U.S. market 
and believe that counterfeits are only a problem in developing countries.92  In reality, 
however, the U.S. market has not been immune to counterfeit drugs.  The World 
Health Organization (WHO) estimates that counterfeit drugs account for less than 
 
91. Id. at 18. 
92. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., COMBATING COUNTERFEIT DRUGS i (2004), available at 
http://counterfeiting.unicri.it/docs/FDA%20combating%20ctf%20drugs.pdf (“In many more countries, 
counterfeit drugs are common.  In the United States, a relatively comprehensive system . . . has kept drug 
counterfeiting rare, so that Americans can have a high degree of confidence in the drugs they obtain 
through legal channels.”). 
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1% of drug sales in the United States.93  In 2010, American’s spent over $300 billion 
on medicine, nearly $4 billion of which was spent on prescription drugs.94  Even one-
tenth of 1% of drug sales in the United States still equates to more than $300 million 
worth of drugs that may have been affected by counterfeits each year.95  
Counterfeit drugs pose a serious challenge to governments throughout the 
world.  Global sales of counterfeit drugs were estimated to reach $75 billion in 2010.96  
According to WHO, counterfeited drugs could account for 30% of the markets in 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America.97   Because the majority of drug ingredients 
consumed in the United States come from countries that experience serious 
problems related to counterfeiting, American patients have become increasingly 
exposed to drug safety issues.98  
The 2008 heparin crisis is only one of several incidents during which the FDA 
has discovered counterfeits in imported drugs.  In June 2003, the FDA discovered 
30,000 bottles of fake Lipitor, a top-selling anti-cholesterol pill.99  It took the FDA 
over two years to complete its investigation of how the counterfeit drugs entered 
legitimate distribution channels and subsequently reached patients.100  Investigators 
discovered that Mr. Julio Cruz conspired with other individuals to smuggle $42 
million worth of counterfeit Lipitor into the U.S. market.101  Cruz and his co-
conspirators pled guilty to their roles in distributing counterfeit, misbranded, and 
illegally imported drugs.102 H.D. Smith Wholesale Drug Co., the fourth largest drug 
wholesaler in the United States, was also implicated in the counterfeit Lipitor 
scandal.103  The investigation revealed that one conspirator paid more than $400,000 
in kickbacks to an employee of H.D. Smith who bought counterfeit Lipitor and other 
fake drugs for further distribution.104  In the settlement with the federal government, 
 
93. Counterfeit Medicines, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/medicines/services/counterfeit/ 
impact/ImpactF_S/en/ (last revised Nov. 14, 2006) [hereinafter Counterfeit Medicines]. 
94. IMS INSTITUTE FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, THE USE OF MEDICINES IN THE UNITED 
STATES:  REVIEW OF 2010, at 4, 8 (2011), available at http://www.imshealth.com/deployedfiles/ 
imshealth/Global/Content/IMS%20Institute/Static%20File/IHII_UseOfMed_report.pdf. 
95. This calculation was inspired by two sources.  See Bryan A. Liang, Fade to Black:  Importation 
and Counterfeit Drugs, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 279, 283 (2006) (performing a similar calculation based on 
WHO estimates); PEW HEALTH GRP., AFTER HEPARIN:  PROTECTING CONSUMERS FROM THE RISKS OF 
SUBSTANDARD AND COUNTERFEIT DRUGS 13 (2011), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploaded 
Files/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Health/Pew_Heparin_Final_HR.pdf (performing a similar calculation 
based on FDA estimates). 
96. Counterfeit Medicines, supra note 93. 
97. Id. 
98. See GAO-12-46, supra note 1, at 2 (“The FDA Commissioner has said that globalization presents 
huge and growing challenges and that economic adulteration remains a public health threat.”). 
99. FDA Uncovers More Fake Lipitor, USA TODAY (June 3, 2003), http://www.usatoday.com/news/ 
health/2003-06-03-fake-lipitor_x.htm. 
100. Stephanie Saul, F.D.A. Hoping For Indictment Over Fake Pills, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2005), 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9807E2DA123FF935A15754C0A9639C8B63. 
101. Florida Man Gets 13 Years in Lipitor Case, KANSAS CITY BUS. J. (Oct. 23, 2006), http://www. 
bizjournals.com/kansascity/stories/2006/10/23/daily7.html?page=all; Florida Man Pleads Guilty in Lipitor 
Conspiracy, KANSAS CITY BUS. J. (Nov. 6, 2006), http://www.bizjournals.com/kansascity/stories/2006/ 
11/06/daily2.html?page=all. 
102. Id.; Illinois Company Settles Fake Lipitor Case for $2.2M, KANSAS CITY BUS. J. (May 11, 2006), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/kansascity/stories/2006/05/08/daily27.html?page=all [hereinafter Illinois 
Company]. 
103. Illinois Company, supra note 102. 
104. Id. 
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H.D. Smith agreed to pay $2.2 million in civil forfeiture to the federal government.105  
It remains unclear, however, whether H.D. Smith’s civil forfeiture was derived from 
proceeds gained from distributing the counterfeit Lipitor.106  
Despite the FDA’s efforts after the heparin crisis, counterfeits remain a threat 
to public health in the United States.  In 2010, the FDA warned consumers that a 
counterfeit version of Alli, an over-the-counter weight-loss drug, did not contain 
active ingredients.107  Instead, the counterfeit Alli contained a controlled substance 
that could cause harm to consumers.108  In the same year, the FDA discovered fake 
versions of Tamiflu, Viagra, and Lipitor sold over the Internet.109  A Belgian citizen 
was sentenced to forty-eight months in prison for marketing counterfeit drugs 
through online sales.110  In February 2012, Roche Co. warned physicians, hospitals, 
and patients that a counterfeit version of Avastin was found in the U.S. market.111  
Avastin is a widely used cancer drug with sales in the United States exceeding $2.5 
billion in 2011.112  Roche’s preliminary testing indicated that the counterfeit version 
of Avastin did not contain the active ingredient.113  The FDA sent warning letters to 
nineteen physicians who were suspected of purchasing the counterfeit Avastin.114  It 
remains unclear how much of the counterfeit Avastin was distributed in the U.S. 
market or whether the counterfeit caused any harm.115   
1. Distribution Loopholes 
Counterfeit drugs cannot harm patients without first entering legitimate 
distribution channels in the U.S. market.  The heparin crisis and other counterfeit 
drug incidents demonstrate that the regulation of drug distribution is inadequate.  
While the FDA has exclusive power to regulate drug approval and manufacturing, it 
does not regulate the drug distributions that take place within state boundaries.116  
Each state has its own laws regulating drug distribution, repackaging, dispensing, and 
diversion. 117   For example, as of March 2012, twenty-six states required drug 
 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Warns Consumers About Counterfeit Alli (Jan. 
18, 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm197857.htm. 
108. Id. 
109. Jonathan D. Rockoff & Christopher Weaver, Fake Cancer Drug Found in U.S., WALL ST. J. 
(Feb. 15, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204795304577223472661091252.html. 
110. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Belgian Citizen Sentenced for Selling Counterfeit, 
Misbranded Drugs (June 3, 2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/CriminalInvestigations/ 
ucm257945.htm. 
111. Rockoff & Weaver, supra note 109. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. See PEW HEALTH GRP., supra note 95, at 70 (“The FDA and the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration investigate suspected illegal activity by wholesalers and pharmacies when it crosses state 
lines, but states are responsible for most compliance oversight.”). 
117. Liang, supra note 95, at 288.  An excellent source for drug pedigree requirements by state is 
available on the National Alliance for Model State Drug Laws’ website at http://www.namsdl.org/ 
documents/StateStatutoryCompilationJuly2011.pdf. 
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distributors to maintain pedigrees, or transaction histories, of the drugs they 
market.118  Another two states are considering such legislation.119  The purpose of the 
drug pedigree requirement is to prevent counterfeit drugs from slipping into the 
stream of commerce. 120   Nevertheless, twenty states still do not have such 
requirements.121  The discrepancies among various states’ requirements have created 
loopholes that allow counterfeit drugs to enter legitimate distribution chains in states 
that have no pedigree requirements.  This lack of a pedigree-tracing system 
encumbers communication among distributors, healthcare providers, and patients, 
thus rendering recalls ineffective.  A telling example is that nearly 8,000 patients in 
California were still exposed to the counterfeit heparin even after recalls were 
issued.122  
2. Inadequate Penalties 
Penalties for violation of the FDCA are too lenient to deter drug counterfeiting.  
The FDCA mandates two penalties for counterfeiting: 123   (1) a misdemeanor 
violation carrying only a maximum of one year in prison, a $1,000 fine, or both;124 (2) 
a felony violation, requiring proof of intent to defraud or mislead,125 and punishable 
by three years in prison, a fine not to exceed $10,000, or both.126  Although there is an 
option to prosecute counterfeiting under trademark law, which could lead to a 
maximum of ten years in prison, counterfeit drug cases are often prosecuted under 
the FDCA.127  The criminal penalties for drug counterfeiting are less rigorous than 
those for narcotic trafficking, even though drug counterfeiting can be more 
profitable.128   Due to resource limitations, it is very difficult to uncover drug 
counterfeiting.129  As a result, organized criminals have become increasingly involved 
in counterfeit drug trafficking.130  Drug counterfeiting has even become an important 
source of financing for terrorist operations.131 
 
118. Distributor Licensing and Pedigree Requirements by State, HEALTHCARE DISTRIB. MGMT. 
ASS’N, http://www.healthcaredistribution.org/gov_affairs/.state/state_legis-static.asp. 
119. Id. 
120. States, FDA Pressing Forward with Pedigree, Track and Trace Rules and Regulations, NAT’L 
ASS’N OF BDS. OF PHARMACY (May 3, 2011), http://www.nabp.net/news/states-fda-pressing-forward-with-
pedigree-track-and-trace-rules-and-regulations/. 
121. Distributor Licensing, supra note 118. 
122. PEW HEALTH GRP., supra note 95, at 70. 
123. 21 U.S.C. § 333(a) (2012). 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. PEW HEALTH GRP., supra note 95, at 53. 
128. PFIZER, A SERIOUS THREAT TO PATIENT SAFETY, COUNTERFEIT PHARMACEUTICALS 5 (2007), 
available at http://www.pfizer.com/files/products/CounterfeitBrochure.pdf. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. See id. (“In March 2006, the U.S. Attorney’s Office indicted 18 people for a multimillion-dollar 
international conspiracy to smuggle untaxed cigarettes, counterfeit Viagra and other goods to raise money 
for the Middle East terrorist group Hezbollah.”). 
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II.  THE FDA’S REGULATORY OUTSOURCING  
Several well-publicized scandals in 2007 prompted the FDA to engage with 
foreign governments and set up overseas offices to improve import safety.  First, the 
FDA found melamine, a harmful chemical usually used to make plastics, in pet 
food.132  The FDA’s investigation further revealed that Chinese producers had 
deliberately adulterated the pet food.133  Melamine was much cheaper than real 
protein and was still able to pass inspection.134  Approximately 17,000 consumers 
complained that their pets were injured after eating Chinese-made pet food.135  As a 
result of the contamination, more than 2,000 dogs died.136  Shortly after the pet food 
scandal, the FDA discovered that Chinese-made toothpaste sold in Miami and other 
cities contained a toxic chemical agent.137  The FDA estimated that over $3 million 
worth of toothpaste in the U.S. market was imported from China.138  In the same 
year, Chinese-made toys were found to contain high levels of lead, which could have 
resulted in injuries to children throughout the United States.139  
Consequently, food and product safety became the top issue in U.S.-China 
bilateral trade relations in 2007.140  President George W. Bush issued an executive 
order to create the Interagency Working Group on Import Safety (IWG).141  The 
IWG’s mission was to “identify actions and appropriate steps that can be pursued, 
within existing resources, to promote the safety of imported products.”142  Against 
this background, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the 
FDA issued action plans to improve import safety.143  The plans called for the federal 
 
132. Brenda Goodman, Pet Food Contained Chemical Found in Plastic, F.D.A. Says, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 31, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/31/us/31petfood.html. 
133. David Barboza, China Finds Two Companies Guilty in Tainted Pet Food Export, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 8, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/08/business/worldbusiness/08iht-petfood.5.5627364.html. 
134. David Barboza & Alexei Barrionuevo, Filler in Animal Feed Is Open Secret in China, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 30, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/30/business/worldbusiness/30food.html?page 
wanted=all. 
135. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., IMPORT ALERT 99-29 (Aug. 14, 2012), http://www.accessdata.fda. 
gov/cms_ia/importalert_267.html [hereinafter IMPORT ALERT 99-29]. 
136. Id. 
137. Walt Bogdanich, Toxic Toothpaste Made in China Is Found in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2007),  
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/02/us/02toothpaste.html. 
138. Id. 
139. Eric S. Lipton & David Barboza, As More Toys Are Recalled, Trail Ends in China, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 19, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/19/business/worldbusiness/19toys.html?pagewanted=all. 
140. Glenn Somerville, Paulson—Food Safety a Top Issue for US-China Talks, REUTERS (Dec. 7, 
2007), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/12/07/usa-china-idUKWAT00856120071207. 
141. Exec. Order No. 13,439, 72 Fed. Reg. 40,053 (July 20, 2007), available at http://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/FR-2007-07-20/pdf/07-3593.pdf. 
142. Id. 
143. Major reports on import safety to the President include:  (1) INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON 
IMP. SAFETY, IMPORT SAFETY—ACTION PLAN UPDATE:  A PROGRESS SUMMARY (July 2008), available 
at http://archive.hhs.gov/importsafety/report/actionupdate/actionplanupdate.pdf [hereinafter ACTION 
PLAN UPDATE]; (2) INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON IMP. SAFETY, ACTION PLAN FOR IMPORT 
SAFETY:  A ROADMAP FOR CONTINUAL IMPROVEMENT (Nov. 6, 2007), available at 
http://archive.hhs.gov/importsafety/report/actionplan.pdf [hereinafter ACTION PLAN FOR IMPORT 
SAFETY]; (3) INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON IMP. SAFETY, PROTECTING AMERICAN CONSUMERS 
EVERY STEP OF THE WAY:  A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR CONTINUAL IMPROVEMENT IN IMPORT 
SAFETY (Sept. 10, 2007), available at http://archive.hhs.gov/importsafety/report/report.pdf [hereinafter 
PROTECTING AMERICAN CONSUMERS]. 
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government to negotiate cooperative arrangements with foreign governments on 
product safety to include measures for (1) conducting inspections in foreign 
countries; (2) collaborating with foreign governments to conduct joint investigations; 
and (3) expanding information-sharing channels on product safety.144  Since 2008, the 
FDA has set up more than ten overseas offices in China, India, Europe, the Middle 
East, and Latin America, three of which are in China.145  Cooperation with foreign 
governments has become the primary means for the FDA to regulate import safety.  
Currently, the FDA has sixty-seven agreements with foreign governments regarding 
the safety of food, drugs, and medical devices manufactured for the U.S. market.146 
A. Agreement with China  
The FDA and China’s State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA) signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding Agreement regarding drug and medical device 
safety (the Agreement) in December 2007.147  Renewed in 2009, the Agreement will 
remain effective until 2013.148  
The purpose of the Agreement is to exchange information between the two 
parties and encourage regulatory cooperation on the safety of drugs and medical 
devices manufactured for their respective markets.149  Thus, the parties will “improve 
their mutual understanding of, and gain greater confidence in,” each other’s drug 
safety systems.150  The Agreement covers a number of products designated by each 
party based on actual or potential risk of fraudulent practices in previous trade.151  
The FDA designated ten drugs and devices including gentamicin sulfate, 
atorvastatin, sildenafil, dietary supplements intended for erectile dysfunction or 
sexual enhancement, human growth hormone, oseltamivir, cephalosporin 
manufactured in facilities that also manufacture non-cephalosporin drugs, glycerin, 
glucose test strips, and condoms. 152   Heparin is noticeably missing from the 
 
144. ACTION PLAN FOR IMPORT SAFETY, supra note 143, at 24–25. 
145. The  three  Chinese offices  are  in  Beijing,  Shanghai,  and Guangzhou.  U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 10-960, FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION:  OVERSEAS OFFICES HAVE 
TAKEN STEPS TO HELP ENSURE IMPORT SAFETY, BUT MORE LONG-TERM PLANNING IS NEEDED 8 
(2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/310614.pdf. 
146. See Memoranda of Understanding and Other Cooperative Arrangements, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/InternationalPrograms/Agreements/MemorandaofUnderstanding/default.htm 
(last updated Nov. 30, 2012) [hereinafter MOU] (listing the memoranda of understanding currently in 
existence between the FDA and foreign governments). 
147. Agreement Between the Department of Health and Human Services of the United States of 
America and the State Food and Drug Administration of the People’s Republic of China on the Safety of 
Drugs and Medical Devices, U.S.-China, Dec. 11, 2007, T.I.A.S. No. 07-1211, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/InternationalPrograms/Agreements/MemorandaofUnderstanding/ucm107512.htm 
[hereinafter Agreement]. 
148. MOU, supra note 146. 
149. Agreement, supra note 147, art. I. 
150. Id. art. II(B). 
151. Id. art. IV(A)(1). 
152. Id. art. IV(A)(2).  SFDA designated drugs and devices are:  recombinant human insulin, lysine 
fat and lysine salt, cefoperazone and its salts, paclitaxel injection, penicillin and its finished dosage form, 
diagnostic kit for blood screening (specifically, for HIV/AIDS and hepatitis B & C), intraocular lenses, 
and cardiac pacemakers.  Id. 
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designated list because the agreement was signed before the heparin crisis broke 
out.153   
The most problematic provision in the agreement is that the FDA will 
eventually rely on the SFDA to verify whether Chinese firms that export drugs and 
medical devices to the U.S. market are in compliance with U.S. law.154  According to 
this provision, when the FDA deems that regulatory conditions in China are met, the 
FDA will recognize that SFDA-certified products satisfy U.S. requirements and may 
enter the U.S. market.155  The provision essentially sets a goal for the FDA to 
outsource its regulatory power to the Chinese government.  While the provision may 
greatly facilitate bilateral trade of drugs and medical devices, the potential risk to 
U.S. patients has been largely overlooked.  Soon after the signing ceremony for the 
Agreement, the Chinese government faced yet another domestic food scandal in 
which at least nine infants died and over 300,000 children were sickened by 
adulterated milk powder laced with melamine, the same chemical responsible for the 
pet food crisis in the United States.156  Will the Chinese government live up to the job 
of safeguarding drug and medical devices destined for the U.S. market?  In order to 
answer this question, it is necessary to examine the Chinese drug safety regulatory 
framework. 
III.  DRUG REGULATION IN CHINA 
During the Korean War,157 a number of wounded soldiers died of infection after 
using expired drugs or unsanitary medical devices provided by Dakang, a privately 
owned pharmaceutical company in Shanghai.158  Investigation revealed that Wang 
Kangnian, the owner of Dakang, bribed sixty-five officials in twenty-five government 
departments in order to win the defense contract.159  Chairman Mao was furious and 
ordered Wang’s immediate execution, despite the fact that there were no drug safety 
laws in place.160  The harsh punishment showed that Mao was determined to root out 
 
153. The Agreement was signed on December 11, 2007.  Agreement, supra note 147.  The heparin 
crisis took place in 2008.  Wassener, supra note 24. 
154. Agreement, supra note 147, art. IV(C). 
155. Id. 
156. Mark McDonald, Death Sentences in China Milk Case, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2009), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2009/01/22/news/22iht-23MILK.19584434.html; Elizabeth Weise & Julie Schmit, FDA Limits 
Chinese Food Additive Imports, USA TODAY, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/2007-04-
30-chinese-imports-usat_N.htm (last updated May 1, 2007). 
157. Otherwise known in China as the War Resisting America and Aiding Korea. Jianshang Wang 
Kangnian Pianqv Zhiyuanjun Gouyao Jvkuan Shanghai Shi Gong’an Ju Genjv Dianyuan Jianjv Ba Gaifan 
Daibu (奸商王康年骗取志愿军购药巨款上海市公安局根据店员检举把该犯逮捕) [Wang Kangnian 
Defrauded Huge Sum of Money from Troops, Shanghai Public Security Bureau Arrested Wang Based on 
Information Provided by a Sales Clerk], XINHUANET, Feb. 16, 1952, http://www.cass.net.cn/zhuanti/ 
y_kmyc/review/1952/mouth2/19520216-04.htm (on file with author). 
158. In the early 1950s, like other major industries, pharmaceuticals were privately owned.  Wuer 
Nian Quanguo Dajia Qiangbi Liang Jianshang Zhenshe Ji Shi Nian (五二年全国打假枪毙俩奸商震慑几十
年) [The Execution of Two Swindlers in 1952 Had Deterrence for Decades], FENGHUANG LUNTAN (Jan. 
13, 2009), http://blog.ifeng.com/article/2047317.html (on file with author) [hereinafter Two Swindlers].  
After the socialization movement at the end of the 1950s, the Chinese government nationalized all major 
industries.  Liu, supra note 66, at 282. 
159. Two Swindlers, supra note 158. 
160. Id. 
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counterfeiting by any means necessary.  Mao later waged an all-out crusade against 
private businesses, which led to the nationalization of major industries in the late 
1950s.161  
In 1963, the State Council promulgated its first drug regulation, titled the Rules 
of Drug Administration.162   In 1984, the People’s Congress enacted the Drug 
Administration Law (DAL), which was amended in 2001.163  The 2001 DAL sets 
forth the current regulatory framework for drug administration in China.164  To 
implement the DAL, the government subsequently issued a number of regulations 
on drug approval and registration.165  
Influenced by the U.S. model, the State Council decided to merge several then-
existing government agencies that were in charge of drug administration and create a 
single entity in 1998—the Drug Administration.166  In 2003, the State Council 
renamed the Drug Administration the State Food and Drug Administration 
(SFDA).167  The head of the SFDA enjoys administrative privileges at a level only 
slightly lower than that of ministries.  According to the DAL, the SFDA is 
responsible for drug registration, approval, and quality control.168  Provincial and 
local governments are responsible for supervision of drug production and 
distribution within their jurisdictions.169  
A. The Drug Administration Law  
Like U.S. law, the DAL requires that drug makers seek premarket approval 
from the SFDA for the production of new drugs.170  The DAL also requires that drug 
makers have certified drug specialists, maintain sanitary condition in facilities, 
designate personnel and equipment for quality control, and establish internal rules 
and procedures for safe production.171  Additionally, the DAL states that drug 
makers must comply with “Drug Production Quality Administration Protocols,”172 
which serve as a legal basis for the SFDA to require all drug makers to meet GMP 
 
161. Shehui Zhuyi Sanda Gaizao (社会主义三大改造) [Three Big Socialist Reforms], XINHUANET, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-09/03/content_1060054.htm (last visited July 6, 2012). 
162. Woguo Yaopin Guanli Fa he Yaopin Zhuce Guanli Banfa de Lishi Yange (我国《药品管理法》
和《药品注册管理办法》的历史沿革) [Historical Development of Drug Administration Law and Drug 
Registration Law in China], BEIJING YIYAO WEISHENG FAXUE LVSHI (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.yixuefalv. 
com/onews.asp?id=3409 (on file with author) [hereinafter Yange]. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. Zhuce Fengbao Zhong Yiyao Hangye Xianzhuang (注册风暴中医药行业现状) [Current Situation 
of the Pharmaceutical Industry in the Midst of Registration Storm], ZHONGYAO, http://www.zhong-
yao.net/shi/32170.htm (last visited July 6, 2012). 
167. SFDA OF CHINA, http://www.sfda.com (last visited July 23, 2012). 
168. Yange, supra note 162. 
169. Yaopin Guanli Fa (药品管理法) [Drug Administration Law] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 28, 2001, effective Dec. 1, 2001) art. 5 (China), available at 
http://www.sfda.com/drug-administration-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china.html [hereinafter DAL]. 
170. See generally 1 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. § 13:79 (2011) (explaining the four stages of U.S. FDA 
proceedings for drug approval); DAL, supra note 169, arts. 29–31. 
171. DAL, supra note 169, art. 8. 
172. Id. art. 9. 
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standards.173  In addition to the production process, the DAL further requires that 
drug makers ensure the safety and quality of active drug ingredients and excipients.174 
1. Inspections 
The SFDA may inspect drug production and distribution.175  Drug makers and 
distributors must permit SFDA inspectors to access drug facilities and must 
cooperate with inspections.176  The SFDA may also conduct random inspections 
without notice.177  During the inspections, if the SFDA finds evidence indicating that 
a drug may cause harm to human health, it can seize that drug and halt production.178  
If the SFDA does so, it must issue an administrative decision within seven days.179  If 
the SFDA needs to conduct further analysis of the suspected drugs, it must issue a 
decision within fifteen days.180  The SFDA must also periodically publish inspection 
results.181  If the drug maker being inspected disagrees with the SFDA’s inspection 
results, it can request an administrative retest.182  In addition, the DAL established an 
adverse drug reactions system, which requires that drug makers, distributors, and 
health providers make timely reports to the SFDA once they discover severe adverse 
drug reactions.183  
2. Fake Drugs  
Since fake drug scandals prompted changes to the DAL, the new law has 
several sections devoted to combating fake and substandard drugs.  According to 
Article 48, a fake drug is defined as a drug produced under any of the following 
circumstances: 
(1) The ingredients in the drug are different from those specified by the 
national drug standards;  
(2) A non-drug substance is substituted for a drug, or a substitute drug is 
mislabeled as a genuine drug;  
(3) Use of the drug is prohibited by law;  
(4) The drug is produced or imported without required approval, or 
marketed without required testing;  
(5) The finished drug has been spoiled or deteriorated;  
 
173. See discussion of GMP regulations infra Part III.B.1. 
174. DAL, supra note 169, art. 11. 
175. Id. art. 64. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. art. 65. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. DAL, supra note 169, art. 65. 
181. Id. art. 66. 
182. Id. art. 67. 
183. Id. art. 71. 
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(6) The finished drug has been contaminated;  
(7) The drug has been produced using ingredients prohibited by law or 
substances without approval numbers as required by law; or 
(8) The effects of the drug are misrepresented or beyond the drug’s 
specified scope.184   
Drug makers that engage in drug production without SFDA permits will face 
closure and forfeiture of all illegal gains.185  In addition, they will be fined two to five 
times the sale amount.186  Those who manufacture fake drugs may face termination of 
production licenses, closure, forfeiture of all illegal gains, and fines of two to five 
times the sale amount.187  Owners of drug manufacturers that produce fake or 
substandard drugs causing severe consequences are barred from re-entering the drug 
industry for ten years.188  In any case, if circumstances are serious enough, criminal 
prosecutions will be initiated.189   
3. Criminal Penalties and Civil Liabilities 
The criminal law of China imposes severe sanctions on those who produce 
counterfeit or substandard products that cause serious bodily injury or death.190  
Product safety in China is regulated by China’s Product Quality Law,191 which 
requires sellers to inspect and verify the quality of products192 and prohibits the 
production or sale of products that fail to meet that standard.193  The consequences 
for producing adulterated products range from halt of production to confiscation to 
fines equaling up to 300% of the total sale.194  Under the most serious circumstances, 
the penalty may include revocation of the producer’s business license and even 
criminal investigation. 195   If the fake drugs cause serious harm or death, the 
responsible parties will face penalties ranging from three years to life 
 
184. Id. art. 48. 
185. Id. art. 73. 
186. DAL, supra note 169, art. 73. 
187. Id. art. 74. 
188. Id. art. 76. 
189. Id. arts. 73–75, 77. 
190. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa (中华人民国和国刑法) [Criminal Law of the People’s 
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 1979, effective Jan. 
1, 1980, amended Mar. 14, 1997) arts. 140–42 (China), available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/ 
newLaws/criminalLawENG.php [hereinafter PRC Criminal Law] (imposing sentences of up to fifteen 
years imprisonment and fines up to ¥2 million). 
191. Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Chanpin Zhiliang Fa (中华人民共和国产品质量法) [The 
Product Quality Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., effective Sept. 1, 1992, amended July 8, 2000) art. 32 (China), available at 
http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/Article/1694405/Channel/9942/PRC-Product-Quality-Law-
Revised.html [hereinafter PRC Product Quality Law] (synonymous with products liability law). 
192. Id. art. 33 (“Sellers shall implement the system of examination and acceptance of goods 
procured, verifying the product quality certificates and other marks.”). 
193. Id. art. 32 (“Producers shall not adulterate their products or pose fake products as genuine or 
shoddy products as good or substandard products as standard.”). 
194. Id. arts. 49–50 
195. Id. art. 50; PRC Criminal Law, supra note 190, arts. 141–42. 
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imprisonment.196  If the circumstances are particularly serious, the death penalty may 
be imposed.197  In either case, responsible parties will face a fine of 50% to 200% of 
the sale amount or a confiscation of the total amount of the illegal proceeds.198 
A series of recent counterfeit drug scandals prompted lower courts to seek 
guidance from the Supreme People’s Court on how to interpret Article 141.  In 2009, 
the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate Communique 
jointly issued a judicial interpretation of Article 141 (the Interpretation).199  The 
Interpretation clarifies the meanings of terms such as “seriously endanger human 
health” and “particularly serious harm.”200  Furthermore, the Interpretation expressly 
extends criminal penalties to medical institutions, such as hospitals and clinics, which 
knowingly administer fake drugs to patients.201   
In terms of compensation, the producer of a defective product may be liable for 
medical expenses as well as any lost earnings as a result of the injury. 202  
Compensation may also cover the living expenses of a party’s dependants if the 
defective product left the victim disabled.203  In cases that result in the victim’s death, 
the law entitles the decedent’s surviving dependants to funeral and living expenses.204  
 
196. PRC Criminal Law, supra note 190, arts. 141–42. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Zuigao Renmin Jianchayuan Guanyu Banli Shengchan Xiaoshou Jiayao 
Lieyao Xingshi Anjian Jüti Yingyong Falü Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi (最高人民法院、最高人民检察院关于
办理生产、销售假药、劣药刑事案件具体应用法律若干问题的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme 
People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate on Several Issues Regarding the Specific 
Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases about Production and Sale of Counterfeit or Substandard 
Drugs] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct. & Sup. People’s Proc. Communique, Feb. 24, 2009, effective 
May 27, 2009), 2009 SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. 7 (China), available at http://www.court.gov.cn/ 
qwfb/sfjs/201002/t20100210_1060.htm [hereinafter Interpretation]. 
 Article 1 Where any fake medicine produced or sold falls under any of the following 
circumstances, it shall be deemed as “seriously endangering the human health” as prescribed in 
Article 141 of the Criminal Law: 
 (1) The fake medicine contains toxic or hazardous substances that are prohibited by the national 
drug standards, or the toxic or hazardous substances that it contains exceed the national drug 
standards; 
 (2) The fake medicine belongs in the category of narcotic drugs, psychotropic drugs, toxic drugs 
for medical use, radioactive drugs, contraceptive drugs, blood products or vaccines; 
 (3) The fake medicine is mainly administered to pregnant and lying-in women, infants, children, 
or critically ill patients; 
 (4) The fake medicine belongs in the category of injection drugs or first aid drugs; 
 (5) There is no drug production license or production approval code or the said license or code 
is counterfeit, and the fake medicine belongs in the category of prescription drugs; or 
 (6) Any other circumstance of seriously endangering the human health. 
Id. 
200. Id. art. 2. 
201. Id. art. 4. 
202. PRC Product Quality Law, supra note 191, art. 44. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. 
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B. Law in Practice  
In 1998, Mr. Zheng Xiaoyu became the first director of the Drug 
Administration, which would later become the SFDA.205  During Zheng’s eight-year 
tenure, he was credited with transforming the Drug Administration’s framework and 
initiating numerous reforms that helped China become one of the world’s leading 
pharmaceutical exporting countries.206  However, Zheng’s career ended tragically.  In 
2007, Beijing’s No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court sentenced Zheng to death for 
corruption and dereliction of duty.207  Although corruption cases were common in 
China, Zheng was one of a few high-ranking officials to receive the death penalty in a 
decade.  Zheng’s trial offered a rare glimpse of the inner workings of the SFDA and 
the challenges that the Chinese government faces in enforcing the laws and 
regulations on drug safety. 
As the head of the SFDA, Zheng carried out two reforms:  (1) establishing 
GMP standards, and (2) consolidating all new drug approval processes.208  These 
initiatives were aimed at increasing drug quality control.  Zheng strongly believed 
that the Chinese pharmaceutical industry would not be able to face challenges in the 
international market without these two reforms.  Ironically, it was Zheng’s tenacious 
efforts in pushing the whole industry forward that sent him on the path towards the 
death penalty.209  
1. Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP)   
During the first year of his tenure, Zheng oversaw the promulgation of many 
major regulations, several of which addressed quality control processes, such as good 
manufacturing practice (GMP), good clinical practice (GCP), and good laboratory 
practice (GLP).210  His contribution towards institutionalizing China’s drug safety 
framework was profound.211  In 2001, China became a member of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), which provided the Chinese drug industry with unprecedented 
opportunities in the international market.  With its abundance of cheap labor and its 
lax environmental regulations, China had great potential to become a powerhouse 
for drug manufacturing.  Zheng’s push for GMP certification among China’s drug 
makers greatly facilitated their cooperation with western pharmaceutical firms, all of 
which had already incorporated GMP into their production processes in the 1960s.  
Therefore, GMP certification was a valuable ticket for Chinese pharmaceuticals to 
 
205. David Barboza, A Chinese Reformer Betrays His Cause, and Pays, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/13/business/worldbusiness/13corrupt.html?pagewanted=all. 
206. Id. 
207. David Barboza, China Sentences Former Drug Regulator to Death, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/world/asia/29cnd-drug.html. 
208. Barboza, supra note 205. 
209. See id. (arguing that companies’ profit losses due to the reforms led to the corruption of the 
SFDA and Zheng, which consequently resulted in Zheng’s execution). 
210. Heping  Jia,  China  Syndrome—a Regulatory Framework in Meltdown?,  25  NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 835, 835 (2007); see also Zheng Xiaoyu Zai Di Sanci GAP Qicao Gongzuo Huiyi Shang 
de Shumian Jianghua (郑筱萸在第三次 GAP 起草工作会议上的书面讲话) [Zheng’s Speech On the Third 
GAP Drafting Meeting], CHINAPHARM (Sep. 22, 2004), http://www.chinapharm.com.cn/html/gap/ 
09300720040922.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2012). 
211. See Jia, supra note 210, at 836 (“You cannot deny those achievements by SFDA simply because 
Zheng did a poor job in the end.”). 
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enter the world stage.212  Even after Zheng’s execution, scholars agreed that he 
guided the Chinese drug industry in the right direction.213  Professor Yang Yue 
commented that the GMP requirement was a necessary step to improve drug quality 
and safety:  “You don’t know what horrible conditions some drug makers had been 
in.  For example, in some traditional Chinese medicine companies, workers stirred 
the drugs with their feet.”214  
In practice, however, Zheng’s idealistic regulations were met with strong 
resistance from the pharmaceutical industry for several reasons:  First, the industry 
viewed these regulations as a straitjacket that increased production costs and limited 
the profit margin.215   To upgrade facilities and hire qualified staff would add 
unbearable financial burden to the drug industry.216  Many firms had to divert funds 
originally budgeted for research and development to meet GMP compliance, which 
seriously reduced these firms’ competitiveness.217  Second, since Zheng ardently 
pushed the regulations through, the drafters did not conduct adequate research or 
broad discussion with the drug industry.218  After promulgation of the regulations, the 
SFDA did not take the time to educate the industry on how to comply with the 
regulations.219  As a result, the industry found the new regulations confusing.220  Third, 
the industry, which was accustomed to deregulation and state stimulus, was never 
before subject to any strict regulations.221  Therefore, most drug makers reacted 
poorly to Zheng’s rigorous demands.  Fourth, the government capped the price of 
drugs to combat growing health care costs.222  In addition, the cutthroat competition 
among drug makers added pressure to cut production costs.223  Drug makers were 
squeezed between government price control and the cost of GMP compliance.   
Despite growing discontent from the drug industry, Zheng required all 
pharmaceuticals to meet GMP standards by 2004.224  Failure to comply with GMP 
standards would result in closure.225  Of 6,700 drug makers, nearly 2,000 lost their 
production licenses for not meeting GMP by the end of 2004. 226   The GMP 
 
212. See He Xin et al., Zhe Yaojian Gaoguan Luoma Gongchu Zheng Xiaoyu (浙药监高官落马供出
郑筱萸) [A Disgraced High Official at the Zhejiang Drug Administration Tipped off Zheng Xiaoyu’s 
Corruption Case], SOHU (Feb. 9, 2007), http://news.sohu.com/20070209/n248140809.shtml. 
213. Id. 
214. Barboza, supra note 205. 
215. See id. (“Companies complained that because of their shrinking profit margins, they did not have 
the money to develop new drugs.”). 
216. Gai et al., GMP Implementation in China:  A Double-Edged Sword for the Pharmaceutical 
Industry, 1 DRUG DISCOVERIES & THERAPEUTICS 12, 12–13 (2007). 
217. Jia, supra note 210, at 836. 
218. Zheng Xiaoyu Shouhui, Wanhu Zhishou An Xingshi Panjue Shu (郑筱萸受贿,玩忽职守案刑事判
决书) [In re Zheng Xiaoyu’s Bribery and Abuse of Power], 2007 Beijing No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct. 
Criminal Judgment No. 1799, § 2 (May 19, 2007) (China) (hereinafter Zheng’s Judgment). 
219. Jia, supra note 210, at 836. 
220. Id. 
221. REGULATION IN ASIA:  PUSHING BACK ON GLOBALIZATION 145 (John Gillespie and Randall 
Peerenboom eds., 2009). 
222. See Barboza, supra note 205 (“Some producers switched to the drugs not covered by the 
government’s price caps.”). 
223. Jia, supra note 210, at 837. 
224. Id. at 836. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. 
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regulations created enormous opportunities for rent-seeking.  Many drug makers 
bribed Zheng with gifts in exchange for speedy approval and other special favors.  
Further investigation revealed that at least one in six pharmaceutical companies in 
Zhejiang Province that were GMP-certified had once bribed Zheng and other high-
ranking officials.227  Unable to resist the temptation of cash, cars, and a free villa, 
Zheng directed his wife and son to form a consulting company in Shanghai to take 
bribes from desperate drug makers.228  According to court documents, Zheng and his 
family accepted more than $850,000 worth of gifts.229  In his confession, Zheng wrote, 
“Why are the friends who gave me money all the bosses of pharmaceutical 
companies?  Obviously because I was in charge of [the] drug administration.”230  
Even though Zheng secretly paid back many of the gifts he received after he stepped 
down from the SFDA, he was not able to avoid the death penalty in the end.231  
2. National Standards  
Another of Zheng’s signature initiatives was to centralize drug registration 
based on a national standard.232  Before this reform, each province had the power to 
approve new drugs and define its own drug standards for packaging and labeling.233  
In addition, each provincial health department held independent power over drug 
registration.234  The inconsistency among provincial drug standards and registration 
systems not only confused consumers, but also stiffened market competition across 
provincial borderlines.  Furthermore, the close ties between drug makers and local 
drug administration officials were often tainted by corruption.235  In 2001, the 
government passed the new DAL, which established a national standard for drug 
registration and marketing.236  According to the new law, the SFDA would review all 
drugs that were already approved by provincial governments and re-register them on 
the condition that they complied with the national standard.237  Neither drug makers 
nor local governments liked the new changes.  Because of the new law, drug makers 
incurred substantial costs in meeting the national standard.  Local governments 
resisted the law because it deprived them of influence over local drug makers.   
 
227. Chen Xiaoying, Shouhui Qianwan Zheng Xiaoyu Wo’an Dujia Jiemi (受贿千万 郑筱萸窝案独家
解 密 ) [Exclusive Report on Mr. Zheng’s Corruption Case], XINJING DAILY (Apr. 9, 2007), 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20070409/15061321771.shtml. 
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Piwen (权力大集中 借“地标”升“国标”之际 郑筱萸狂卖 2600 多件批文) [Centralization of Power:  Zheng 
Xiaoyu Took Advantage of Drug Standardization and Sold More Than 2,600 Drug Registration], SHIDAI 
SHANGBAO (Feb. 8, 2007), http://news.sohu.com/20070208/n248109796.shtml. 
233. Id. 
234. Id. 
235. Liu  Wei, Woguo Yaopin Jianguan de Fengyu Jiunian  (我国药品监管的风雨九年) [Nine 
Tumultuous Years of China’s Drug Regulation], XINHUANET (Mar. 9, 2007), http://news.xinhuanet.com/ 
health/2007-03/08/content_5816477.htm. 
236. DAL, supra note 169. 
237. Yaopin  Zhuce  Guanli  Banfa  (药品注册管理办法)  [Provisions for Drug Registration] 
(promulgated by the St. Food & Drug Admin., July 10, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007) (China), available at 
http://www.sfdachina.com/info/64-1.htm. 
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In practice, the SFDA failed to implement the law because the agency did not 
have a proper procedure in place or enough staff to handle the re-registration 
process.  At trial, Zheng was accused of dereliction of duty for not anticipating the 
massive amount of work that resulted from the overhaul.238  To reduce the workload 
and speed up the process, Zheng delegated to provincial governments the work of 
verifying the authenticity of documents that drug makers submitted for re-
registration.239  The SFDA only reviewed a photocopy of the documents.240  This 
simplified the procedure but seriously compromised the integrity of the registration 
process because it provided loopholes for fraudulent applications. 241   Court 
documents indicate that the SFDA granted registration to a large number of drug 
makers that submitted fake application documents.  For example, Mr. Qingxiang Yu, 
a high-ranking official in Jilin Province, abused his entrusted power and assisted local 
drug makers in falsifying documents in exchange for over ¥1 million ($158,510).242  Yu 
was sentenced to fifteen years in prison.243 
Furthermore, Zheng disregarded the central government’s requirement that the 
power of drug registration and approval must be shared among several subdivisions 
within the SFDA in order to prevent power concentration and corruption.244  Instead, 
Zheng designated only one division with fewer than twenty employees to handle re-
registration applications from all across China.245  He appointed his longtime friend, 
Mr. Cao Wenzhuang, to head the division.  Cao instantly cashed in his unchecked 
power by taking about ¥2 million ($317,020) from pharmaceutical companies in 
exchange for granting registrations.246  In a three-month period, Cao’s division re-
registered 147,900 drugs previously registered by provincial governments.247  Given 
the flawed system and corrupt officials, it came as no surprise that at least six SFDA-
registered drugs were counterfeits.248  
3. New Drug Approval  
Unsurprisingly, the SFDA’s new drug approval process was as chaotic as that 
seen in the drug registration process.  The new DAL granted the SFDA the sole 
power to approve new drugs by stripping provincial governments of such power.249  
The new change coincided with the central government’s price control on generic 
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drugs, which severely squeezed drug makers’ profit margins.  To avoid government 
price control, drug makers used new drugs to compensate for the loss in generic drug 
sales.250  In addition, the SFDA’s regulation defined the term “new drug” loosely.  
For example, even mere dosage changes or technological improvements could cause 
a drug to be approved as a new drug.251  The SFDA’s inadequate definition created a 
loophole for drug manufacturers that allowed them to manipulate the system.  
Rather than relying on research and development, drug makers reshuffled 
ingredients of generic drugs, claimed them as “new drugs,” and sought the SFDA’s 
approval.252  In 2005, the SFDA approved 1,113 applications for “new drugs” that 
were in fact generics with only dosage changes.253  During the same period in the 
United States, the FDA only approved eighty-one new drugs. 254   As in the 
registration process, some drug makers used falsified documentation for new drug 
applications.255  The cozy relationships between Zheng and drug makers that sought 
approval often gave rise to corruption.  “Court records show that when a company 
named the Double Doves Group sought to register disposable syringes, it offered 
shares to Mr. Zheng’s wife; his son received a used Audi, consulting fees and 
property in Shanghai.”256  
4. Fake Drug Scandals  
The impact of counterfeit drugs is difficult to quantify.  For obvious reasons, the 
drug industry does not want to reveal any irregularities.  The government tends to 
censor any damaging information that could cause public unrest.  As a result, there 
are no reliable statistics revealing to what extent fake drugs have caused death and 
illness in China.257  A series of food and drug scandals, however, have had a profound 
impact on public consciousness.  In a widely cited survey, over 70% of the Chinese 
public has lost confidence in the Chinese food and drug regulatory system.258  In 
addition, scholars believe that a series of fake-drug scandals contributed to the doom 
of Zheng’s reign.259  
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a. Xinfu (clindamycin phosphate glucose) 
In July 2006, approximately 100 patients across sixteen provinces became 
violently ill after receiving antibiotic injections of Xinfu.260  At least ten people died 
as a result of using the drug.261  Since the SFDA was extremely slow to react to the 
incident, physicians scrambled to find out what exactly caused the severe reactions to 
Xinfu, a very commonly used drug.262  On August 3, 2006, a week after the death of a 
six-year-old girl, the SFDA issued a public notice warning about adverse reactions to 
Xinfu.263  Had the SFDA acted more quickly, doctors would not have given Xinfu to 
the girl.264  Further investigation uncovered that Huayuan, the maker of Xinfu, 
violated GMP standards in the production process to curb costs.265  Ironically, 
Huayuan was one of the first drug makers to receive GMP certification from the 
SFDA in 1999.266  However, neither the SFDA nor the local drug administrative 
bureau has ever conducted thorough inspections to verify whether Huayuan actually 
enforced GMP standards in the production process.  Local officials and inspectors 
stated that they rarely went to pharmaceutical plants to conduct GMP inspections, 
except for occasional symbolic tours.267  According to these officials, it was Huayuan’s 
responsibility to conduct self-inspections to ensure GMP standards were observed.268  
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b. Qiqihar No. 2 Pharmaceutical 
At about the same time that the Xinfu scandal broke out, thirteen patients died 
in Guangzhou after receiving Armillarisni A, made by Qiqihar No. 2 Pharmaceutical 
(Qiqihar No. 2).269  Like Huayuan, Qiqihar No. 2 received GMP certification from 
the SFDA in 2005.270  Mr. Guo Xingping, deputy general manager, testified that the 
company obtained GMP certification by paying ¥10,000 ($1,566) even though the 
company was clearly incapable of meeting the GMP standards for production.271  The 
company’s drug-ingredient acquisition manager, Mr. Niu Zhongren, only had a 
middle-school education.272  In 2005, Niu ordered one metric ton of counterfeit 
propylene glycol, which in fact was diethylene glycol, a toxic material used in making 
plastic and industrial dyes.273  If the company had enforced the GMP protocol, its 
laboratory would have discovered the counterfeit materials.  However, most of the 
company’s laboratory staff had never studied chemistry nor received any formal 
training.274  No one conducted any analytical screening of the fake materials before 
they were put into the manufacturing process. 275  
c. Toxic Toothpaste and Pet Food  
Even though the counterfeit scandals involving Hauyuan and Qiqihar No. 2 
caused far more damage in China than the tainted pet food caused in the United 
States, American media outlets did not pay much attention to the safety issues in the 
Chinese pharmaceutical industry.276  The FDA did not take serious precautions until 
after it received reports from owners that their dogs had fallen ill, or had died, after 
consuming Chinese-made pet food.277  Further laboratory testing indicated that the 
counterfeit pet food contained melamine, a cheap chemical that was often used to 
make plastics and fertilizers.278  Some Chinese pet food makers had found that 
melamine mimicked protein so closely that it easily passed regular inspections.279  It 
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was the U.S. media’s pervasive reporting on the pet food scandal that severely 
tarnished the reputation of Chinese-made products in the U.S. market.280  Since 
exportation was a driving force for China’s economic growth, the pet food scandal 
put the Chinese government under enormous pressure.281  
Even though corruption crimes in China are subject to capital punishment, the 
sentence of immediate execution took both Zheng and his lawyer by surprise.282  
Some scholars observed that Zheng’s punishment was indeed much heavier than 
those imposed on other high-ranking officials who accepted more bribes than 
Zheng.283  In addition, Zheng’s passionate confession and efforts to pay back bribes 
were mitigating factors that could have persuaded the court to sentence him to the 
death penalty with a two-year suspension, which would have eventually been 
commuted to life imprisonment.284  According to scholars, the reason the court 
disregarded Zheng’s mitigating actions was that his dereliction and corruption had 
threatened the public health and damaged the reputation of China’s food and drug 
industry in China.285  In essence, the Chinese government used Zheng’s execution to 
prove that it was serious about food and drug safety.286 
5. Problems Continue  
Zheng’s execution did not put an end to corruption in China’s drug industry.  
Recent scandals demonstrate that corrupt officials continue to cash in on their power 
over drug registration and approval.  As a result, fake drugs continue to claim lives 
and inflict grave injuries to patients. 
In 2010, the rabies vaccine manufactured by Yanshen Pharmaceutical Co. 
(Yanshen) caused injuries to more than one million people.287  Yanshen was a leading 
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manufacturer of the rabies vaccine in China, with annual sales of ¥180 million ($28 
million).288  In 2008, the local health department imposed fines on Yanshen for 
multiple violations, which included cutting corners, falsifying data, and evading 
inspections.289  To recoup the loss, Mr. Zhongyi Zhang, the vice-manager of Yanshen, 
was secretly ordered to release substandard vaccines to the market.290  According to 
regulations regarding vaccine production, a firm must seek approval from the health 
department before marketing vaccines.291   Zhang directed the company’s chief 
scientist to fabricate lab reports and send false samples to the state quality control 
office, which quickly approved the products.292  As a result, Yanshen sold 53,293 
doses of substandard rabies vaccines in seventeen provinces for ¥1,601,282 
($252,658).293  At trial, Zhang admitted that it was a common practice to falsify lab 
reports and provide false samples to ensure approval for marketing.294  Zhang further 
testified that among the dozens of vaccine makers in China, only some were up to 
international standards, while others lagged far behind.295  To stay in the market, 
many manufacturers without the required technology and facilities took illegal 
measures to get their products approved, such as falsifying documents, bribing 
officials, or both.296 
Shortly after the fake vaccine scandal, a criminal investigation led to the arrest 
of five SFDA officials, including Mr. Wei Liang, a subdivision director in charge of 
biological drug supervision and GMP certification.297  Wei allegedly received bribes 
totaling ¥1,470,000 ($232,594) from at least twenty-five different pharmaceutical 
companies that were seeking drug registration and approval.298  Despite the public’s 
wide suspicion that the fake vaccine scandal prompted the arrest, the government 
openly denied a direct link.299  Having learned a lesson from previous scandals, the 
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government restricted information regarding the case.300  At a ninety-minute-long 
trial (unusually short even by Chinese standards), the Beijing court invoked a 
summary procedure and limited the audience to two of Wei’s family members.301  
There was no information about which drug makers bribed Wei in exchange for what 
special favor, nor was any information released regarding what happened to the 
drugs produced by the companies that bribed Wei.302  By all appearances, the 
government tried to put a quick end to Wei’s case in order to prevent further public 
suspicion of other officials and drug makers. 
There is no punishment more extreme than the death penalty.  By executing the 
country’s top drug regulator, the Chinese government has shown its dedication to 
drug safety.  However, Zheng’s execution has failed to deter corrupt dealings 
between regulators and the food and drug industry.  Scandals continue to claim lives 
and inflict injuries.  Despite the Chinese government’s genuine efforts to clean up 
corruption, drug safety will remain one of the top issues in the foreseeable future. 
CONCLUSION  
Judging by appearances alone, there is no great disparity between the United 
States’ Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and China’s Drug Administration 
Law (DAL).  Even the English translation of the Chinese agency’s name underscores 
the similarities between China’s SFDA and the United States’ FDA.  The reason for 
the similarities between the two laws is that the U.S. law serves as a model for 
China’s DAL.  Despite their differing political structures and legal systems, each 
country’s law designates a special agency in charge of drug safety supervision.  Both 
laws emphasize pre-market approval, inspection, and post-market sanctions to 
ensure drug safety.  In terms of legal provisions, regulatory agencies, and desire to 
ensure drug safety, the two systems are very much aligned.  Perhaps due to this 
perception, the FDA had engaged with its Chinese counterpart in hopes that the 
SFDA would share the burden of regulating drugs made for the U.S. market.  In 
practice, however, the Chinese law as it is written on paper is entirely different from 
what is put into action.  Unfortunately, the FDA either completely overlooked or 
unwisely disregarded this critical factor when it reached agreement with China.  
The ideal outcome of the FDA’s agreement is that its foreign counterpart will 
regulate manufacturers exporting drugs to the U.S. market as rigorously as the FDA 
regulates U.S. manufacturers producing similar products for domestic consumption.  
However, even if the foreign government makes genuine efforts and does what it 
promised in the agreement, the risk of adulteration and counterfeiting remains.  This 
is because the regulatory framework and environment of the foreign country is 
drastically different from that of the United States.  While scholars often criticize 
lenient penalties for counterfeiting and cite a lack of resources for prosecuting such 
crimes in the United States, the criminal penalties, albeit inadequate, are wholly 
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inapplicable in foreign jurisdictions.  It is therefore quite naïve to expect a foreign 
government to cooperate with the FDA in times of crisis.  Even under the existing 
agreement, the FDA’s attempt to investigate a Chinese firm in the heparin crisis was 
met with enormous resistance from the Chinese government.  When its reputation 
and profit are at stake, a foreign government will make every effort to protect its 
own business interests, even at the expense of U.S. consumers.  Therefore, the 
FDA’s reliance-on-foreign-governments approach to drug safety is seriously flawed. 
